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Cutting-Edge Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses
of New Digital Investigation Methods in Litigation
ALEXA KOENIG AND LINDSAY FREEMAN†
The increased use of digital technologies in daily life has led to a steep rise in the introduction
of highly technical evidence and expert witness testimony in criminal and civil litigation. The
growing use of novel, quickly-developing investigation methods for digital evidence presents
several challenges related to the difficulty lay persons have in judging complex forensic
methodologies. The lack of judicial and legal training in the underlying methods and their
potential vulnerabilities can result in fact-finders who over-rely on experts’ conclusions
without properly interrogating the evidence themselves.
While many of the scientific and analytical methods employed by digital investigators can be
promising additions to investigative toolkits, enthusiasm for these techniques should be tempered
with healthy skepticism—and knowledge of the most helpful questions to ask about new
investigative processes. In this Article, we identify the very real vulnerabilities in digital open
source investigations and encourage careful analysis of each component in order to mitigate the
risks. We recommend that investigators preserve digital material according to established
forensic standards and carefully record the steps of their online investigation and analysis.
Expert witnesses should be strictly prohibited from giving opinions on matters that stretch
beyond the scope of their education, training, and well-established expertise. Lawyers and
judges must be prepared to ascertain the reliability and validity of digital open source
investigations and their findings through thorough interrogation of the underlying data. As a
best practice, digital evidence should be triangulated with physical, testimonial, or other
documentary evidence whenever possible. If conducted carefully and professionally, digital open
source investigations can offer tremendous value for both civil and criminal proceedings.

† Lecturer and Executive Director, Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law and Technology
Law and Policy Program Director, Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law, respectively. The authors
thank Anthony Ghaly for his research and drafting support; the editors at Hastings Law Journal for their careful
work; as well as Kelly Matheson, Yvonne McDermott, Annie O’Reilly, Eric Stover and the participants of the
Pound Civil Justice Institute’s 2021 Symposium on the Internet and the Law at UC Hastings, College of the Law
for their feedback on earlier drafts. Any errors are, of course, the authors’ own.
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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of January 6, 2021, the day Congress was set to affirm Joe
Biden’s victory in the United States presidential election, a large crowd of
Trump supporters gathered on the Capitol lawn. At noon, then-President Donald
Trump spoke to his supporters. Claiming—despite all evidence to the contrary—
that he and not Biden had won the election, he told his followers to “show
strength”1 and to “walk [with him] down to the Capitol.”2 Many turned to march.
By 1:00 p.m., the crowd had overwhelmed the building’s security and breached
its barricades. Angry rioters armed with camera phones and, in some cases,
weapons, swarmed the building while hundreds more clashed with officers
outside, forcing legislators and staff into hiding. It was several hours before the
sergeant-at-arms was able to declare the building secure.3 By then, the damage
was done—the building trashed, five people dead or dying, and democracy
degraded.
The events that day led to numerous civil and criminal cases. The United
States Department of Justice responded by launching what has been described
as the largest investigation in U.S. history, both in terms of the number of
defendants and the volume of digital evidence.4 Their work was supplemented
by an army of online citizen investigators who provided useful tips and analysis
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement to assist in the
identification of the insurrectionists. By October 2021, close to 700 people had
been charged for their alleged role in the riots.5
Civil litigation has been similarly extensive. Cases have ranged from a
lawsuit brought by Democratic Representative Eric Swalwell of California
against former President Trump and others who spoke at the rally,6 to a lawsuit
brought by the former President to block the House January 6 Select Committee

1. Charlie Savage, Incitement to Riot? What Trump Told Supporters Before Mob Stormed Capitol, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/us/trump-speech-riot.html.
2. Id.
3. See Lauren Leatherby, Arielle Ray, Anjali Singhvi, Christiaan Triebert, Derek Watkins & Haley Willis,
How a Presidential Rally Turned into a Capitol Rampage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/12/us/capitol-mob-timeline.html (showing a timeline of the
events of January 6, 2021); George Petras, Janet Loehrke, Ramon Padilla, Javier Zarracina & Jennifer Borresen,
Timeline: How the Storming of the U.S. Capitol Unfolded on Jan. 6, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2021/01/06/dc-protests-capitol-riot-trump-supporters-electoralcollege-stolen-election/6568305002/.
4. Willy Lory, January 6 Capitol Riot Anniversary: Biggest Criminal Investigation in US History, THE
NAT’L NEWS (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2022/01/04/capitol-riotanniversary-biggest-criminal-investigation-in-us-history.
5. See, e.g., Madison Hall, Skye Gould, Rebecca Harrington, Jacob Shamsian, Azmi Haroun, Taylor
Ardrey, & Erin Snodgrass, At Least 800 People Have Been Charged in the Capitol Insurrection So Far. This
Searchable Table Shows Them All, INSIDER, https://www.insider.com/all-the-us-capitol-pro-trump-riot-arrestscharges-names-2021-1 (Mar. 17, 2022, 5:13 PM).
6. Carrie Johnson, A Lawsuit Against Jan. 6 Rally Speakers Forces DOJ to Consider Who’s Legally
Immune, NPR: POLITICS (July 26, 2021, 4:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/26/1020786560/a-lawsuitagainst-jan-6-rally-speakers-forces-doj-to-consider-whos-legally-immun.
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from releasing information about his alleged involvement.7 This was joined by
a civil rights lawsuit filed by seven Capitol police against Trump, the Trump
campaign, the Stop the Steal limited liability corporation, and members of the
Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and others who were allegedly involved in the
violence.8
Given insurrectionists’ widespread use of smartphones and social media to
share photos, videos, and other information online as events unfolded, such
content has proven especially critical to finding and identifying suspects.9
Digital detectives have gathered potentially useful information that is aiding
both criminal and civil litigation. However, in addition to the clear opportunities,
there are drawbacks to using this information as evidence in the courtroom.
Having written extensively about the opportunities presented by digital open
source information elsewhere,10 in this Article, we focus on those limitations.
Digital open source information pulled from social media and other online
spaces is playing an increasingly important role in establishing the who, what,
where, why, when, and how of world events that result in civil and criminal
cases, both domestic and international.11 According to researchers, between
2010 and 2017, the Ninth Circuit alone saw a 350% increase in the use of social
media evidence.12 Even more dramatically, between 2007 and 2017, California’s
state courts experienced a 3,933% increase.13 Nationally, 97% of Americans
now own a cellphone, with 85% possessing a smartphone capable of recording
videos and posting them to the Internet.14 Globally, by 2018 humans were
7. Caroline Linton, Trump Sues House January 6 Committee in Attempt to Block Release of Documents,
CBS NEWS (Oct. 19, 2021, 8:10 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-lawsuit-january-6-capitol-riotcommittee-court-documents-executive-privilege.
8. Complaint at 9–14, Smith v. Trump, No. 1:21-cv-02265 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2021),
https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/001-Complaint.pdf.
9. Id. at 15–53.
10. See, e.g., Lindsay Freeman, Prosecuting Atrocity Cases with Open Source Evidence: Lessons from the
International Criminal Court, in DIGITAL WITNESS: USING OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
INVESTIGATION, DOCUMENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 48 (Sam Dubberley, Alexa Koenig & Daragh Murray,
eds., 2020); Alexa Koenig, Open Source Evidence and Human Rights Cases: A Modern Social History, in
DIGITAL WITNESS: USING OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION, DOCUMENTATION
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 32 (Sam Dubberley, Alexa Koenig & Daragh Murray eds., 2020); Alexa Koenig &
Lindsay Freeman, Strengthening Atrocity Cases with Digital Open Source Investigations, LIEBER INST. W.
POINT (Apr. 1, 2021), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/strengthening-atrocity-cases-digital-open-sourceinvestigations; Lindsay Freeman & Alexa Koenig, Links in the Chain: How the Berkeley Protocol is
Strengthening Digital Investigations and International Collaboration, in VERIFICATION IN THE AGE OF GOOGLE
(forthcoming 2022).
11. Open source information is defined as information that is publicly accessible on the internet and that
any person can collect through observation, request or purchase. HUM. RTS. CTR., UC BERKELEY SCH.OF L. &
U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., BERKELEY PROTOCOL ON DIGITAL OPEN SOURCE
INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf
[hereinafter BERKELEY PROTOCOL].
12. Lynne Graves, William Bradley Glisson & Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, LinkedLegal: Investigating
Social Media as Evidence in Courtrooms, 38 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 1, 12 (2020).
13. Id.
14. Mobile Fact Sheet, Pᴇᴡ RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/
mobile.
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creating “more than 2.5 quintillion (eighteen zeros) bytes of data every day,”15
a number that is expected to grow to 463 exabytes by 2025.16 Litigants have
increasingly relied on this digital content to strengthen fact-finding in a diverse
array of cases, from personal injury cases where the scope of plaintiffs’ harms
are in dispute,17 to trademark cases where social media may help establish
consumers’ brand confusion,18 to defamation cases where the accuracy of
negative claims are at issue,19 to civil litigation brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act for alleged human rights violations20––as well as national and
international criminal prosecutions.21
Given the growing use of digital information and communication
technologies, the field of practice known as “digital open source investigations”
is rapidly expanding.22 Such investigations—which rely heavily on usergenerated content such as videos and photos posted to social media, as well as
on commercial satellite imagery23—differ both qualitatively and quantitatively
from more traditional, analog forms of open source information, such as nongovernmental organization reports, newspapers and radio broadcasts.
While the use of digital open source investigation techniques and the
engagement of lay investigators can offer tremendous value to both private
litigants and law enforcement, the introduction of any new scientific or technical
investigative methods and any resulting evidence into legal proceedings also
comes with significant risks.24 In seeking accountability for the events of
January 6, lawyers and investigators have faced a “glut of social media
evidence,” a phenomenon that has both helped and hindered their ability to parse
fiction from fact.25 The events of that day have also underscored the difficulties
15. Forensic Examination of Digital Devices in Civil Litigation: The Legal, Ethical and Technical Traps,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
professional_lawyer/2016/volume-24-number-1/forensic_examination_digital_devices_civil_litigation_legal_
ethical_and_technical_traps.
16. Branka Vuleta, How Much Data is Created Every Day? [27 Staggering Stats], SEEDSCIENTIFIC: BLOG
(Oct. 28, 2021), https://seedscientific.com/how-much-data-is-created-every-day.
17. Vasquez-Santos v. Mathew, 168 A.D.3d 587, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (highlighting where the
defendant was permitted access to social media posts in which the plaintiff was tagged that showed the plaintiff
playing basketball post-accident and could be used to rebut claims that he could no longer play).
18. See, e.g., Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Marc Anthony Cosmetics, Inc., 57 F.Supp.3d 1203, 1213 (C.D. Cal.
2014) (considering the admissibility of Facebook posts in which customers discussed Moroccanoil’s products).
19. Ben Meyerson & Andrew Wang, Tweet Lawsuit: Chicago Landlord Sues Ex-Tenant Over Tweet
Complaining About Apartment, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 2009), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-twittersuit-29-jul29-story.html.
20. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al-Werfalli, ICC-01/11-01/17-13, Warrant of Arrest ¶¶ 3, 12–16, 22, 29 (Aug.
15, 2017) (showing that the videos posted to social media provided the basis for an international arrest warrant).
22. See generally Alexa Koenig, Emma Irving, Yvonne McDermott & Daragh Murray, New Technologies
and the Investigation of International Crimes: An Introduction, 19 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1 (2021); BERKELEY
PROTOCOL, supra note 11.
23. Rebecca J. Hamilton, User-Generated Evidence, 57 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 58 n.241 (2018).
24. The risk of wrongfully convicting an innocent person while the real perpetrator goes free.
25. Mistaken Identity: FBI Probe into Jan 6 Rioters Sees Challenges, AL JAZEERA (May 6, 2021),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/6/mistaken-identity-fbi-probe-into-jan-6-rioters-sees-challenges.
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and limitations endemic to the field of image comparison and interpretation—a
practice that includes matching visual clues in videos, photographs, and satellite
imagery—raising the possibility that individuals could be misidentified and
mistakenly implicated in wrongdoing.26
While several scholars have now written about the advantages of relying
on digital open source information from a plaintiff or prosecution perspective
(including us),27 few have addressed the vulnerabilities of these methods from a
defense perspective.28 Potential shortcomings, which are common to both civil
and criminal law should be acknowledged for a number of reasons—not only
because it is important for attorneys and investigators to be prepared for them as
digital open source investigations increase in popularity, but to ensure that the
integration of these materials into legal processes does not harm due process or
impede the truth.
In this Article, we present a roadmap of how such user-generated evidence
could be challenged in both civil and criminal cases. In particular, we discuss
the components of a digital open source investigation that are most vulnerable
to cross-examination—six lines of inquiry that attorneys can use to probe the
quality of such investigations, and for which both proffering attorneys and expert
witnesses should be prepared. These include challenges to (1) the investigator’s
qualifications and experience, (2) the investigative process, (3) the evidence
itself, (4) the analytical conclusions, (5) the witnesses’ testimony about the
evidence and analysis, and (6) the in-court presentation of the evidence.
We take a critical perspective to exploring the use of these digital methods
with the goal of strengthening the quality and professionalism of the results. Our
critical perspective is not meant to hinder the growing use of digital open source
information, but rather to ensure that such information is introduced into
courtrooms responsibly and effectively. Lowering the bar, only to introduce
mistaken findings in cases and produce bad verdicts, can do significant damage
to the long-term credibility of these techniques and the legitimacy of our legal
system.

26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Emma Irving, And So It Begins. . . Social Media Evidence in an ICC Arrest Warrant,
OPINIOJURIS: BLOG (Aug. 17, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/08/17/and-so-it-begins-social-media-evidencein-an-icc-arrest-warrant; Koenig & Freeman, supra note 10; Lindsay Freeman, Digital Evidence and War
Crimes Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and Trials,
41 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 283, 307–27 (2018); Alexa Koenig, Felim McMahon, Nikita Mehandru & Shikha
Silliman Bhattacharjee, Open Source Fact-Finding in Preliminary Examinations, in 2 QUALITY CONTROL IN
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 681 (Morten Bergsmo & Carsten Stahn eds., 2018); DIGITAL WITNESS: USING
OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION, DOCUMENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
(Sam Dubberley eds., 2020) (multiple sources).
28. See Yvonne McDermott, Alexa Koenig & Daragh Murray, Open Source Information’s Blind Spot:
Human and Machine Bias in International Criminal Investigations, 19 J. INT’L CRIM JUST. 85, 88 (2021) for
initial critiques.
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I. CHALLENGING THE INVESTIGATOR
Due to the relative newness of social media and smartphones, many of the
lay and professional investigators conducting open source investigations have
received little or no formal training for the job. Instead, digital open source
investigators are often self-taught, drawing on skills from a number of different
fields of practice and educational resources.29 Of course, the fact that there is not
yet a well-established field of practitioners does not preclude their participation
in justice processes.30 However, the absence of standard procedures grounded in
proper testing and objectively verifiable successes makes such investigators
particularly vulnerable to challenge, providing the defense with multiple lines to
attack their credibility on voir dire.
Open source investigators do not necessarily have the academic credentials
or certifications that are typical for expert witnesses who attest to the validity of
scientific evidence in court.31 Defense attorneys may argue that without formal
scientific training the investigator or analyst may not adhere to the same
standards or take the same precautions against bias as those who have that
training. Defense attorneys may also argue that such lay investigators do not
understand the methodological value of safeguards such as peer review, working
with multiple hypotheses, and clear documentation of the investigative process.
By contrast, professional investigators and forensic experts have usually
received formal training.32 The typical corollary to formal training would be
years of experience, ideally under the supervision of a more experienced
investigator. Today, in many large organizations, open source investigations are
conducted by relatively young or junior members of a team because of their
facility with digital technologies.33 However, even in this newer information

29. A number of digital open source investigation “toolkits” and trainings support the learning of new tools
and methods. See, e.g., Justin Nirdine, OSINT Framework, OSINT FRAMEWORK, https://osintframework.com
(last visited July 1, 2022); OSINT Tools, OSINT TECHNIQUES, https://www.osinttechniques.com/osinttools.html (last visited July 1, 2022); Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Tool and Resources, OSINT.LINK,
https://osint.link/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_zYiy28FklWuQb6uaf8lM6iDHwxZzDCfOeCRx1TR1v9w1629768034-0-gqNtZGzNAdCjcnBszQh9 (last visited July 1, 2022). See Trainings and Workshops, U.C.
BERKELEY HUM. RTS. CTR., https://humanrights.berkeley.edu/resources/trainings-and-workshops (last visited
July 1, 2022) for examples of training courses; Open Source Investigations for Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://advocacyassembly.org/en/partners/amnesty (last visited July 1, 2022); Training, BELLINGCAT,
https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/training (last visited July 1, 2022); Michael Bazzell, Online OSINT Video
Training, INTEL TECHNIQUES, https://inteltechniques.com/training.html (last visited July 1, 2022).
30. See, e.g., About, BELLINGCAT, https://www.bellingcat.com/about (last visited July 1, 2022) (discussing
the lay investigation team’s contributions to justice efforts).
31. For example, the founder of Bellingcat, Eliot Higgins, is self-taught. See ELIOT HIGGINS, WE ARE
BELLINGCAT: GLOBAL CRIME, ONLINE SLEUTHS, AND THE BOLD FUTURE OF NEWS 67 (2021).
32. See, e.g., UT National Forensic Academy, UT L. ENF’T INNOVATION CTR., https://leic.tennessee.edu/
home/training/forensic-training/national-forensic-academy/#:~:text=The%20National%20Forensic%
20Academy%20(NFA,from%20across%20the%20United%20States (last visited July 1, 2022); Upcoming
Regular Courses, INST. FOR INT’L CRIM. INVESTIGATIONS, https://iici.global/courses (last visited July 1, 2022)
for an overview of investigation training topics.
33. See, e.g., Gretchen Kell, Doctor, Lawyer, Open Source Investigator? New Field Plucks Berkeley
Grads, BERKELEY NEWS (May 1, 2019), https://news.berkeley.edu/2019/05/01/this-one-doctor-lawyer-open-
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environment, basic principles of research and analysis apply—and thus having
a deep understanding of the building blocks of quality research is critical.
Open source investigators are often generalists: people who understand
how and where individuals communicate online and have a sense of the broad
array of tools and platforms that can assist in finding and evaluating that
information.34 They are jacks of all trades, often masters of none. While they
draw on a vast repository of online data and software, experimenting with tactics
affiliated with well-established disciplines, including digital forensics, data
science, geospatial analysis, forensic image and video comparison, and forensic
image and video interpretation, they are rarely experts in any of these fields.
While the ability to self-educate is an important one, such breadth of expertise—
while invaluable—should complement and not supplant the depth of
understanding that comes with expertise in established fields of practice.
Disciplinary canons exist for a reason: to ensure quality work, minimize
blind spots, and ideally protect the legitimacy of those disciplines. In the
international open source investigation context, the Berkeley Protocol on Digital
Open Source Investigations offers professional, methodological, and ethical
principles that speak to the necessary ability of the investigator to credibly
perform various open source investigation tasks, and to assess when an expert
in a subfield should be called in to either supplant or supplement a generalist’s
process and analysis.35 The principles require indicia of accountability,
competency, accuracy, objectivity, legality, humility, independence,
transparency, and security awareness, among others.36
Other critical considerations include whether the investigator has preexisting biases that may prejudice the investigation, and if so, the kinds of preexisting biases; whether the investigator may have been biased or prejudiced by
the information environment; and whether the investigator is susceptible to
external influence that may call into question the quality of the conclusions,
either because of funding sources, reputational concerns, or otherwise.37
II. CHALLENGING THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS
After examining the investigator’s qualifications and competencies,
lawyers should assess whether there are any vulnerabilities to the quality of the
investigation itself—in particular, the process by which the investigator
identified, collected, and preserved online information. Such an examination
source-investigator-new-field-seeks-berkeley-grads (discussing the newness of open source investigations and
the training of college students to do this work).
34. Examples of the wide array of tools that an open source investigator might use are available on open
source investigation “dashboards,” which are essentially websites that aggregate hyperlinks to those tools.
Nirdine, supra note 29; Bruno Mortier, OSINT START.ME, https://start.me/p/ZME8nR/osint?locale=en (last
visited July 1, 2022).
35. BERKELEY PROTOCOL, supra note 11, at 9–15.
36. Id. at 11–15.
37. See, e.g., McDermott et al., supra note 28, at 88.
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should evaluate the thoroughness and objectivity of online inquiries to ensure
that the investigator has not intentionally or inadvertently cherry-picked open
source information, the criteria that was used to determine what to collect, and
the forensic soundness of the tool used to capture and preserve the information.
One of the biggest opportunities and challenges for online investigators is
the sheer scale of information flooding the Internet. As of 2021, approximately
6,000 tweets were being sent out every second;38 by late 2018 more than 400
hours of stories were being uploaded to Instagram each day; and 500 hours of
videos were being uploaded to YouTube each minute.39 This volume makes it
impossible for human investigators to thoroughly review all potentially relevant
information online. The vast and dynamic nature of the Internet and the
significant volume of information it holds make digital investigations vulnerable
to multiple challenges regarding the investigator’s decision-making process,
especially their determination of what is and is not relevant and what they choose
to review and collect. This becomes especially critical in cases where relevant
information has been removed from the Internet between the time of the event
and the start of a formal legal investigation, for example, due to social media
content moderation or the user regretting their post. In such cases, the item
collected by a lay investigator may be the only version available by the time the
case gets to trial.
The average person may not be familiar with the many biases that influence
online investigations, but professionals and lay investigators who document
information from the Internet should be aware of such biases and should take
proactive measures to counter them.40 Three categories of bias are especially
important to consider. The first is access bias, which relates to who has access
to digital tools and who does not, and thus whose perspectives and experiences
are and are not represented online.41 The second is algorithmic bias, which refers
to a search engine’s programming and how it determines which search results
should be shown to its users.42 Search results from Google, Yahoo, Bing,
Yandex, Baidu and DuckDuckGo differ between users, and between each other.
Their search algorithms use several data points—including, but not limited to,
the user’s location, device, browser, and prior search history—to prioritize and

38. See “Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts,” OMNICORE (Feb. 22, 2022),
https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics.
39. See generally Lindsay Freeman & Raquel Vazquez Llorente, Finding the Signal in the Noise:
International Criminal Evidence and Procedure in the Digital Age, 19 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 163 (2021); see
also Anmar Frangoul, With Over 1 Billion Users, Here’s How YouTube is Keeping Pace with Change, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/14/with-over-1-billion-users-heres-how-youtube-is-keeping-pace-withchange.html (Mar. 14, 2018).
40. See generally RICHARDS J. HEUER JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS (1999), for an
overview of biases especially relevant to digital open source investigations; see also McDermott et al., supra
note 28, at 100.
41. See McDermott et al., supra note 28, at 89.
42. Id.
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customize which websites are displayed.43 Therefore, digital investigators must
take proactive measures to maximize the neutrality of their search results. The
specific keywords and languages they use along with the Boolean operators
deployed to connect sources and keywords, can also radically influence results.44
The third category of bias consists of the investigator’s cognitive biases, which
may influence not only how and where the investigator searches for information,
but how they interpret results, what they choose to collect and preserve, and what
they disregard.45
Another issue is documentation: one of the biggest differences between
amateur and professional open source investigators is often how they document
their investigation—or fail to do so. Accepted standards require that all technical
processes, such as the extraction and processing of images, must be documented
in detailed contemporaneous notes.46 These notes should include details of any
hardware or software used to process the information, and the parameters
applied. Such notes may be disclosed in court. Investigators without legal or
other formal training may be unaware of documentation expectations, which can
have significant downstream effects. As one example, poor documentation
notably led to the exclusion of Facebook evidence in Regina v. Hamdan47—a
Canadian terrorism case that relied on the defendant’s posts, which were
excluded because the various agencies involved in the investigation did not
document their collection, collected information inconsistently, and failed to use
forensic software that would have automatically created a record of the
process.48
In examining the investigation process, lawyers should scrutinize whether
the open source investigator can provide clear, thorough, and, to the extent
possible, contemporaneous documentation of the online inquiry and collection
processes; whether those processes can be audited; and whether the investigator
can account for any documentation gaps or procedural violations.

43. How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/
(last visited July 1, 2022).
44. See McDermott et al., supra note 28, at 92.
45. See, e.g., Alexa Koenig & Ulic Egan, Power and Privilege: Investigating Sexual Violence with Digital
Open Source Information, 19 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 55, 62–63 (2021); Alexa Koenig & Ulic Egan, Hiding in Plain
Site: Using Online Open-Source Information to Investigate Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes, in
TECHNOLOGIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATION (Alexandra Moore & James Dawes, eds., forthcoming
2022) (both describing how cognitive biases can interview with the effective investigation of international
crimes).
46. See, e.g., 2 NAT’L CRIME AGENCY, CPS, METRO. POLICE & FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, FORENSIC
IMAGE COMPARISON AND INTERPRETATION EVIDENCE: GUIDANCE FOR PROSECUTORS AND INVESTIGATORS 5
(2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
912880/Image_Comparison_and_Interpretation_Guidance_Issue_2.pdf.
47. See generally Regina v. Othman Ayed Hamdan, [2017] S.C.R. 1770 (Can.).
48. See generally id.
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III. CHALLENGING THE EVIDENCE
After examining the investigation process, the opposing party should look
for vulnerabilities in the evidence—the digital information on which the analyst
or expert bases their conclusions. As with other types of evidence, lawyers must
authenticate digital files—establish that an item is what the proffering party says
it is—in order to have it admitted at trial. The malleability and ephemerality of
digital material, however, make such evidence especially vulnerable to
authenticity challenges.49 Proving the authenticity of online evidence is further
complicated by anonymous and pseudonymous sources, lack of provenance, and
widespread mis- and disinformation. The Internet is replete with inauthentic or
misleading sources—bots and botnets,50 cyborgs,51 imitator accounts,52 sock
puppets,53 and pseudonyms—complicating the ability to determine who created
and who posted the item.54 Authentication generally requires establishing an
item’s author/creator, provenance, chain of custody, and integrity. There is a
quickly growing series of cases in which courts have refused to consider social
media-derived evidence because of a lack of appropriate authentication (for
example, finding that authenticity cannot be established by the person who finds
the information on the Internet, but that more is needed).55
Author/creator and provenance can be assessed together in digital open
source investigations, as the term source is often used broadly to encompass both
the platform on which a digital item was found and the user who uploaded it to
that platform. If the content’s origins are unknown, then reverse image searches
and websites like the Wayback Machine that offer a historical timeline and
49. For an overview of various authentication techniques for digital evidence, see Image Alteration
(Forgery) Detection: An Overview of Passive Techniques, JONATHAN W. HAK, Q.C.: BLOG (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://www.jonathanhak.com/2021/10/26/image-alteration-forgery-detection-an-overview-of-passivetechniques/.
50. A bot is an automated social media account. A botnet is a network of private computers taken over by
malicious software to run multiple social media accounts. Botnets can be used to amplify a message and give
the impression that many people are interested in something, when it really comes from one source. See DFRLab,
Human, Bot or Cyborg, MEDIUM (Dec. 23, 2016), https://medium.com/@DFRLab/human-bot-or-cyborg41273cdb1e17.
51. A cyborg is a social media account that is sometimes run by a human and other times automated like a
bot. See id.
52. An imitator account is a social media account created in the name of someone else, usually a celebrity,
in order to pretend to be that person online.
53. A sock puppet is a social media account with a fake identity. See Technisette, Sector035, Micah
Hoffman & Dutch_OsintGuy, The OSINT Puppeteer, OSINTCURIO.US (Dec. 27, 2018), https://osintcurio.us/
2018/12/27/the-puppeteer/.
54. Carlotta Dotto & Seb Cubbon, How to Spot a Bot (or Not): The Main Indicators of Online Automation,
Coordination and Inauthentic Activity, FIRST DRAFT NEWS (Nov. 28, 2019), https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/
how-to-spot-a-bot-or-not-the-main-indicators-of-online-automation-co-ordination-and-inauthentic-activity/.
55. One notable example is a trademark dispute in which the complainant argued that Facebook comments
that had simply been screen-shotted should not be admissible since the posts had not been appropriately
authenticated. The court agreed, citing Internet Specialties W., Inc. v. ISPWest, 05-cv-3296-FMC-AJWX, 2006
WL 4568796 (C.D. Cal. Sept 19, 2006) for the idea that the burden of authentication cannot be properly met “by
the person who went to the website and printed out the home page” since “anyone can put anything on the
internet.” Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Marc Anthony Cosmetics, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1213 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
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record of online data may be used to help the analyst establish the content’s
provenance and author.56 Investigators should start by establishing whether the
content can be attributed to a particular person or organization, and whether it is
primary (first-hand knowledge) or secondary (including second-hand
information or commentary about primary content).
The investigator will also have to address the information’s chain of
custody. There are two chains of custody to consider when dealing with digital
open source evidence: the first refers to possession or control of an item from
when it is created to its collection by the investigator (this is often referred to as
provenance); the second refers to custody, possession, or control of the item
from the time of its collection to its presentation in court.57 Establishing that the
digital item has not been altered once in the investigator’s possession is
important for confirming its authenticity.58 This includes detailing how the
digital item has been preserved and stored, such as whether the item was hashed
and reliably time stamped at the point of collection. Opposing lawyers will want
to ask several questions to determine whether the digital evidence has been
properly preserved. For example, was the evidence collected in a manner that
maintains its integrity using a collection tool that has been recognized as
forensically-sound by a court or other practitioners? Lawyers will also want to
assess whether the collection was complete. In other words, was enough
accompanying information captured in conjunction with the digital item to
understand the context that surrounded it?
The integrity of digital information may be difficult to establish but is
especially challenging (and especially important) if investigators are unable to
establish the author or provenance of the item, or critical links in the chain of
custody. The Internet is rife with intentionally inauthentic information—
including visual or audio disinformation that is misleadingly presented, edited,
distorted, or computer-generated.59 The Internet is also saturated with
information that is unintentionally inauthentic—misinformation that includes
everything from distorted imagery to misguided reporting.60 The increased
accessibility and rapidly falling costs of sophisticated photo and video-editing
software has lowered the bar for amateurs to enter the digital manipulation game
56. See generally Internet Archive, WAYBACK MACHINE, https://archive.org/web/ (last visited July 1,
2022).
57. See generally Aida Ashouri, Caleb Bowers & Cherrie Warden, The 2013 Salzburg Workshop on Cyber
Investigations: An Overview of the Use of Digital Evidence in International Criminal Courts, 11 DIGITAL
EVIDENCE & ELEC. SIGNATURE L. REV. 115 (2014).
58. See generally Record Integrity and Authenticity, in BUILDING AN ELECTRONIC RECORDS ARCHIVE AT
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LONG-TERM STRATEGY
(Robert F. Sproull & Jon Eisenberg eds., 2005) (discussing that an authentic record is one that is what it purports
to be and that has been preserved without alteration).
59. Sophia Ignatidou, Deepfakes, Shallowfakes and Speech Synthesis: Tackling Audiovisual Manipulation,
EUR. SCI.-MEDIA HUB (Dec. 4, 2019), https://sciencemediahub.eu/2019/12/04/deepfakes-shallowfakes-andspeech-synthesis-tackling-audiovisual-manipulation/.
60. Claire Wardle, Understanding Information Disorder, FIRST DRAFT NEWS (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://firstdraftnews.org/long-form-article/understanding-information-disorder/.
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and is aided by the fact that humans are notoriously bad at detecting image
manipulations.61
In addition to authenticity, the proffering party will need to establish the
information’s reliability. Reliability is considered at different stages in different
jurisdictions, sometimes as part of the admissibility assessment and sometimes
as part of the weight assessment. In the absence of traditional indicia of
reliability—such as a witness who can testify to the origins and accuracy of
evidence—investigators must be creative about collecting enough contextual
and corroborating information for a judge or jury to be comfortable relying on
it. In the open source investigation context, reliability can be established through
a three-pronged verification process that includes source analysis, content
analysis and technical analysis.62 According to the Scientific Working Group on
Digital Evidence (SWGDE), image authentication involves an examination of
visual information within an image (the content) and non-visual information
about the image itself (technical aspects like the structure of pixels and any
metadata).63 When it comes to information found on the Internet rather than
directly provided by a witness, authentication also involves an examination of
the source of the image.64 Source analysis differs from the attribution analysis
mentioned above. Attribution analysis is the process of identifying the original
source, if possible,65 whereas source analysis occurs once the source is identified
and needs to be evaluated. Thus, source analysis really means examining the
credibility of the source.66
Content analysis refers to an analysis of the information contained within
the “four corners”67 of the digital item, whether it be an image, video, audio file,
document, spreadsheet, social media post, or something else. In the United
States, the most important factor for the court is usually whether the item is a
fair and accurate portrayal of facts at issue in the case. Using a video pulled from
social media as an example, analysis may include a review of the built or natural
environment depicted in the video to determine if what is seen is consistent with
the purported place and time; scrutiny of human features to determine if known
perpetrators, victims, or witnesses are depicted; evidence of staging; the

61. Sophie J. Nightingale Kimberley Wade, Hany Farid & Derrick Watson, Can People Detect Errors in
Shadows and Reflections?, 81 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 2917, 2917 (2019). Seven
experiments tested people’s ability to use shadows to determine whether an image has been manipulated.
Overall, detection rates were poor. Id.
62. BERKELEY PROTOCOL, supra note 11, at 62–65.
63. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON DIGIT. EVIDENCE, SWGDE BEST PRACTICES FOR IMAGE AUTHENTICATION 4
(2018), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Z0DsJMa6aDZlFJ9kRfOL8cow5VjhVT0t/view.
64. Id. at 10.
65. BERKELEY PROTOCOL, supra note 11, at 63.
66. Id.
67. “Four corners” is a legal term used in contract law to refer to what is written in a document itself. See
Legal Info. Inst., Four Corners of an Instrument, CORNELL L. SCH. (Sept. 2021), https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/four_corners_of_an_instrument#. Here, it is used more broadly to encompass what is seen in an image or
video.
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photographic conditions, such as the quality of lighting, which may affect what
can be perceived; and more.68
Technical analysis includes an examination of any metadata or Exif
(Exchangeable Image File) data that may be attached to the item.69 In order for
forensic video analysts to interrogate imagery, they collect data on “image size,
pixels, type of compression, frame rate, aspect ratio, GOP structure, file format,
etc.”70 Relevant metadata may include the make, model, serial number, and
settings of the device used to capture the image; the date and time of creation,
as well as image resolution and size; any GPS coordinates or elevation data;
information about frame rate, lens or flash; and thumbnails.71 Lay, open source
investigators often use free online tools like InVid or FotoForensics to review
and extract the metadata.72 However, this may differ from the commercial tools
that are used by professional digital forensic analysts working for private law
firms or prosecutors’ offices.
One especially concerning consideration for digital videos is
compression—a process that reduces and removes redundant information so that
the digital video file can more easily be streamed over the Internet or transferred
across a network.73 Most digital videos that are emailed or uploaded online are
subject to something called lossy compression, which means the loss of original
information.74 When there is a loss of data during compression, a computer later
fills in the areas that were lost when compressed.75 This results in artifacting—
a noticeable distortion in the video’s quality.76 Such distortion can be a problem
for lay investigators, who may not be aware of the ways in which such distortion
can be spotted and how it can affect an analysis.
One form of distortion affects perception of movement due to variability in
frame rates. The frame rate of a video is the number of frames in one second of
video. There are standards for real time frame rate, which can vary.77 When a
video is played at that standard rate or higher, the human eye perceives motion

68. See id.
69. BERKELEY PROTOCOL, supra note 11, at 64–65.
70. Interpreting Video Images: Can You “Say What You See”?, JONATHAN W. HAK, Q.C.: BLOG (May 12,
2020), https://www.jonathanhak.com/2020/05/12/interpreting-video-images-can-you-say-what-you-see/.
71. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON DIGIT. EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at 7.
72. See Invid Verification Plugin, INVID, https://www.invid-project.eu/tools-and-services/invidverification-plugin/ (last visited July 1, 2022); FOTOFORENSICS, http://fotoforensics.com/ (last visited July 1,
2022).
73. Digital Video and Compression, RGB SPECTRUM, https://www.rgb.com/digital-video-andcompression#:~:text=Video%20compression%20is%20a%20process,transmission%2C%20recording%2C%20
or%20storage (last visited July 1, 2022).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Video Artifact, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/31896/video-artifact
(last visited July 1, 2022).
77. The real time frame rate for analog video is 30 frames per second under the North American standard,
and 25 frames per second under the European standard. Levi Tijerina, What is Frame Rate, and Why Does it
Matter? (24fps vs. 30fps), GAMUT (Feb. 22, 2021), https://gamut.io/why-frame-rate-matters-24fps-vs-30fps.
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accurately.78 However, if the frame rate falls below the standard because of
compression, the human brain may misinterpret the motion captured in the
video.79 Such human misperception can have disastrous consequences.80 One
example is a case from Florida in which a woman who worked as a nanny was
accused of abusing an infant in her care and charged with eight counts of child
abuse.81 Key evidence was footage captured by a “nanny cam,” a home
surveillance system used to monitor and document caregivers’ behavior, often
without their knowledge.82 At thirty frames per second, the video captured by
the system is consistent with what the “human eye is capable of seeing, so the
image appears fluid.”83 However, this rate is achieved when only one of the four
cameras in the system is operating at a given time; with each additional camera
the resolution drops, all the way down to 7.5 frames per second if all four
cameras are operating—a rate far below what the human eye expects, and one
that produces a “choppy” image.84
On the day the parents reviewed the nanny cam recording, their relatively
choppy video appeared to show the nanny shaking the baby.85 The parents took
the baby to the emergency room and called the police. Although the baby had
no visible injuries, the nanny was arrested for child abuse after a detective
viewed the footage. Because the father allowed the nanny cam to keep running
(police forgot to tell him to turn it off to preserve evidence) the original video
was overwritten and all that was left of fourteen days’ worth of recordings—
which would have provided helpful context and data—was a two-hour long copy
preserved by a law enforcement technician. The nanny spent two years in jail,
refusing to take a plea deal, before the case was ultimately thrown out. While
the parents continued to believe that the video was clear evidence of abuse,
“prosecutors acknowledged that the video evidence was worthless” due to
compression and framerate, which “could make [even] gentle motions appear
violent.”86
In addition to compression and framerate, video and image analysis can be
tainted by a distortion in the aspect ratio, namely the relationship of width to
height and the number of lines of information in the video.87 Reliable
comparison analysis cannot be done on a video with an incorrect aspect ratio;

78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See generally State v. Muro, 909 So.2d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), https://caselaw.findlaw.com/fldistrict-court-of-appeal/1429591.html.
81. Id. at 449.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 450.
86. Nanny Cleared of Violently Shaking Baby, ABC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2006, 7:03 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/LegalCenter/story?id=1749672.
87. HANY FARID, FAKE PHOTOS 87 (2019).
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therefore, the aspect ratio must be corrected before analysis.88 Similarly, reliable
comparison analysis cannot be done on a video or image that is too low quality.
A video or image’s quality—or resolution—might also interfere with analysis.89
Low resolution results in a blurring effect. Resolution degrades with every copy,
and most online videos and images are copies that further degrade when
uploaded to social media platforms and again when downloaded by the
investigator.90 Unlike aspect ratio, poor image quality cannot be corrected.91
Thus, while image comparison can provide compelling evidence in the
courtroom, the strength of the comparison depends in part on the quality of the
imagery. Insufficient quality imagery results in unreliable findings.92
Ultimately, digital open source investigators must properly verify the
digital information on which they rely. False, forged, manipulated, degraded,
and other problematic data can lead to erroneous findings. A significant volume
of digital information, even when seemingly corroborative, cannot compensate
for these underlying weaknesses. Once the digital evidence itself has been
subjected to scrutiny, attorneys should look to the methods used to interpret,
analyze, and draw conclusions about the raw information.

IV. CHALLENGING THE ANALYTICAL FINDINGS
In addition to challenging the imagery on which a conclusion was reached,
defense lawyers may also challenge the method of analysis, particularly if it does
not comply with a set standard in the relevant jurisdiction. Investigators and
analysts should verify digital information before analyzing and reaching
conclusions based on the information. Open source investigators’ lack of
validated analytical methods creates vulnerabilities, which opposing parties can
attack on cross examination. At the same time, open source investigations’
perceived newness may blind lawyers to the similarities between open source
investigation methods like geolocation and well-established analytical methods
like geospatial analysis. For example, an untrained open source investigator
might compare two images to corroborate or disprove the location depicted in
one of the images, failing to realize that there is an established discipline of
88. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON DIGIT. EVIDENCE, SWGDE TECHNICAL OVERVIEW FOR FORENSIC IMAGE
COMPARISON 7 (2019), https://drive.google.com/file/d/11Pa7DOJmSJ00AieJcjNEGu7BJkCnvQkF/view; SCI.
WORKING GRP. ON DIGIT. EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at 10.
89. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON DIGIT. EVIDENCE, supra note 62.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 10.
92. See Best Practices for Forensic Image Analysis, Scientific Working Group on Imaging Technology,
FBI (Mar. 14, 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/
oct2005/standards/2005_10_standards01.htm; Webinar on Image Quality and Clarity: The Key to Forensic
Digital Image Processing, NAT’L INST. JUST. & FOREIGN TECH. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://nij.ojp.gov/events/image-quality-and-clarity-keys-forensic-digital-image-processing; see also 2
FORENSIC IMAGE COMPARISON AND INTERPRETATION EVIDENCE, supra note 45, at 7; Jonathan W. Hak,
Evaluation of the Forensic Science Regulator’s Recommendations Regarding Image Comparison Evidence, 1
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: SYNERGY 294, 294 (2019).
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forensic image comparison that has its own best practices. Similarly, open
source investigators might try to confirm the location of a particular incident by
comparing a video or photograph of the event to publicly available satellite
imagery, while ignorant of the potential distortions, edits and other pitfalls of
which geospatial analysts are well aware.
The scientific process, including the deployment of protocols, is a means
of combating bias when examining and drawing conclusions from data.93 With
video comparison forensics, professional video analysts employ a methodology
known as ACE-VR, an acronym for Analyze Compare Evaluate Verify and
Report.94 The process includes peer review, which is an essential prerequisite
for scientific reliability.95
One of the most common open source investigation techniques is
geolocation, which involves matching built and natural objects in videos and
photographs to satellite imagery in order to determine the physical location
where the images were shot.96 The process of identifying visual clues in a video
or photograph and matching those clues to known imagery is frequently used in
professional investigations. While many claim this practice is new, it is not.
What these investigators are doing falls within a well-defined subset of
forensics: forensic image comparison, as discussed above. Forensic image
comparison is defined as “an assessment of the correspondence between features
in questioned items depicted in images and either questioned or known objects
or images for the purpose of rendering an expert opinion regarding identification
or elimination (as opposed to a demonstrative exhibit).”97 Given this overlap,
the analytical technique used by open source investigators should be considered
and judged based on the standards that have already been established and vetted.
When it comes to the ACE-VR method, according to SWGDE’s best practices,
“In order to accurately interpret the content of an image…it is imperative that
the examiner recognize the conditions and limitations that occurred during
image capture, processing or editing.”98 These conditions and limitations may
include resolution, optical or sensor defects, lighting conditions, and motion

93. NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS, HELPING COURTS AVOID IMPLICIT BIAS: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE
INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS 14–15, https://horsley.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/IB_Strategies_033012.pdf
(last visited July 1, 2022).
94. FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, CODES OF PRACTICE AND CONDUCT, APPENDIX: DIGITAL FORENSICS –
VIDEO ANALYSIS 30–31 (2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/912390/FSR-C-119_Video_analysis_Issue_2.pdf;
Ace-V
(Analysis,
Comparison,
Evaluation and Verification), EVISCAN, https://www.eviscan.com/en/ace-v-method-for-the-examinationanddocumentation-of-latent-fingerprints/ (last visited July 1, 2022).
95. See generally SHAUNA BRITTANI BREWER, ACE-V EXAMINATION METHOD TRAINING MANUAL
(2014), https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/d791sg30j.
96. See Aric Toler, “How to Verify and Authenticate User-Generated Content”, in DIGITAL WITNESS:
USING OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION, DOCUMENTATION AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 198–216 (Sam Dubberley, Alexa Koenig & Daragh Murray, eds., 2020).
97. SCI. WORKING GRP. ON DIGIT. EVIDENCE, supra note 87, at 4.
98. Id. at 7.
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and/or focal blur.99 Therefore, defense attorneys should look at these factors and
the quality of the image upon which the analysis was based in order to determine
whether the analytical conclusions can be challenged on this basis.
V. CHALLENGING THE TESTIMONY
When it comes to testifying in court, there is the threshold issue of whether
a digital open source investigator should be considered a lay witness or an expert
witness. In most jurisdictions, witnesses can only testify to what they did or
observed, while witnesses qualified as experts can provide opinions or
conclusions.100 For certain types of evidence, lawyers have different options for
how to introduce such evidence at trial.101 For example, graphology, otherwise
known as hand-writing analysis, is an example of a comparative method that can
be testified to by a lay witness or an expert.102 Such evidence can be introduced
in three ways: (1) a person who is familiar with the handwriting in question can
testify to its validity; (2) a graphology expert can compare an unknown sample
to a known sample; or (3) the two samples may be presented to the fact-finder
(either judge or jury) to make their own determination about whether the two are
likely from the same person.103
Comparisons between two digital open source images could likely be
introduced to the fact-finder by expert witnesses with their conclusions or by lay
witnesses leaving it to the fact-finders to draw their own conclusions. In most
jurisdictions, case law or statutory rules establish who can be considered an
expert in legal proceedings and thus provide opinions related to the evidence. In
the United States, the standards were established by the Frye (1923)104 and
Daubert (1993)105 cases and were codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Per
that rule:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

99. Id.
100. Dani Alexis Ryskamp, Lay Witness v. Expert Witness: What’s the Difference?, EXPERT INST. (June 25,
2020),
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/the-differences-between-expert-witness-and-laywitness-testimony/.
101. Melissa Taylor, Ron Cowen, Katherine Fuller, Christina Frank, MacKenzie Robertson & Katherine
Ritterhoff, Forensic Handwriting Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice Through a Systems
Approach 79–108 (2020), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2020/NIST.IR.8282.pdf.
102. An expert is a witness that is qualified to testify about a certain area of expertise, and who can
provide conclusions about that area of expertise. A lay witness is a witness that is not testifying as an expert and
therefore does not need to be qualified. A lay witness can only testify to their personal knowledge. See Expert
Witness, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expert_witness (last visited
July 1, 2022).
103. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 100.
104. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
105. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
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(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.106

U.S. case law establishes that the burden is on the proffering party to
establish the admissibility of expert testimony to a preponderance of the
evidence.107 With regard to the practices they might talk about, Daubert lays out
a nonexclusive, non-dispositive checklist that courts can use when assessing
reliability that includes whether the theory or technique has been tested or
subjected to peer review and publication, and whether it has attracted
“widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific community.”108
Since digital open source investigators are often generalists, however,
rather than masters of any particular forensic practice, a third issue concerns the
potential scope of their expertise. Even if the investigator qualifies as an expert
and can therefore provide opinions, it remains unclear as to what they can opine
on. For example, a single video of the aftermath of an explosion might contain
injured people and damaged buildings. A medical forensic expert could provide
testimony with conclusions about the injuries in the video but could not speak
to the structural damage to the buildings. A forensic architect could explain, for
example, the likely cause of a building’s damage, but could not opine about the
cause of injuries to people. Rarely will one person qualify in all of the areas of
expertise about which many open source investigators might draw conclusions.
Thus, defense attorneys can challenge expert witnesses who step outside their
areas of competence.
As established above, in U.S. Federal Rule 702, expert testimony can be
provided by someone “who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.”109 The Federal Rules also provide that an
individual may testify if his or her “scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence,” the “testimony
is based on sufficient facts or data,” “the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods” and “the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.”110 Interpretation of all of these prongs is
relatively unsettled as applied to digital open source investigators and their
methods. This leaves openings for attack—attacks that should be anticipated by
the person testifying and others involved in the case’s progression.

106. Testimony by Expert Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. 702 (2012).
107. Id.
108. Christine Funk, Daubert v. Frye: A National Look at Expert Evidentiary Standards, EXPERT INST. (Aug.
9, 2021), https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/daubert-versus-frye-a-national-look-at-expertevidentiary-standards/#:~:text=Under%20Frye%2C%20the%20scientific%20community,courts%
20consider%20the%20issue%20once.
109. 28 U.S.C. 702 (2011).
110. Id.
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VI. CHALLENGING THE PRESENTATION
Finally, how digital open source evidence is presented in court, for
example, via data visualizations that are packaged as demonstrative evidence,
may raise serious concerns.111 Demonstrative evidence—visual information that
is aggregated and designed to aid the fact-finder(s) in understanding the
geographic layout or other features of a location, such as a 3D digital
reconstruction of a crime scene—is not evidence per se, but a visual aid designed
to assist the judge or jury in their assessment of the actual evidence.112 Such
demonstrative evidence could, for example, consist of charts, maps, and graphs
to help the fact-finder better understand multiple data points. In the open source
investigation context, they are often compilations of many types of data, ranging
from videos to photographs to satellite imagery, and may include 3D
reconstructions of crime scenes, including built and natural layouts.113
Since this “aid to visually link evidence” to the underlying facts of a case
is merely supposed to assist a court’s understanding of the evidence, it is not
supposed to be treated as evidence itself.114 However, there’s a risk that such
visual aids may be overly compelling, resulting in prejudice about how the facts
of the case come together that even judges cannot undo—or of which they may
be unaware.115 This can be particularly damaging if, for example, a digital
reconstruction or other compilation is based on faulty underlying information,
or digital items that are poorly interpreted or constructed.
While the underlying data—the individual videos and photographs that are
evidence—must be introduced separately, the compilation may present and yet
simultaneously obscure the underlying data. Not all data is equally reliable, so
the individual data that comprise the whole might mislead, as might the
compilation. This may become especially acute as new forms of reconstruction
are introduced into courtrooms, such as virtual reality-based reconstructions that
immerse witnesses, lawyers, or judges at the scene of a particular incident or
111. See generally Sarah Zarmsky, Why Seeing Should Not Always Be Believing: Considerations Regarding
the Use of Digital Reconstruction Technology in International Law, 19 J. INT’L CRIM. L. 213 (2021) (discussing
the strengths and weaknesses of introducing demonstrative evidence in international courtrooms). See SITU
Research Merges Data and Design to Create New Pathways of Justice, SITU RSCH. https://situ.nyc/research,
(last visited July 1, 2022), as one example of such visualizations; see also Investigations, FORENSIC
ARCHITECTURE, https://forensic-architecture.org/ (last visited July 1, 2022), as a second example of such
visualizations; Koenig, supra note 10 for a brief history of the use of such visualizations in international criminal
trials.
112. See, e.g., The Complex Case of Cerro de Pasco Explained through an Interactive Platform, SOURCE
INT’L,
https://www.source-international.org/news/discover-the-case-of-cerro-de-pasco-through-the-newplatform (last visited July 1, 2022); see also Working Draft: Practitioner Guidelines on the Use of Digitally
Derived Evidence in International Accountability Mechanisms 43–49 (Leiden U. 2021).
113. See, e.g., SITU Research Launches SPEA Project, SITU (June 12, 2015), http://www.situstudio.com/
blog/category/human-rights/.
114. Working Draft, supra note 111, at 43.
115. Waltraud Baier, Jason Warnett, Mark Payne & Mark A. Williams, Introducing 3D Printed Models as
Demonstrative Evidence at Criminal Trials, 63 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1298, 1302 (2018); Rachael M. Carew, Ruth
M. Morgan & Carolyn Rando, A Preliminary Investigation into the Accuracy of 3D Modeling and 3D Printing
in Forensic Anthropology Evidence Reconstruction, 64 J. FORENSIC SCI. 342, 342 (2018).
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event.116 Ultimately, the judge and jury may be unable to interrogate each part
of a potentially persuasive or even prejudicial whole.
In addition, these reconstructions can be expensive, ultimately
exacerbating equality of arms considerations between prosecution and defense,
and magnifying disparities between wealthy and less well-resourced parties.
Finally, the demonstrative evidence may be constructed in such a way that it not
only represents underlying facts but tells a story: it might fill in gaps or
unknowns to make a narrative of events flow better or enable the viewer to fill
in gaps in their head that may take on a sense of being the truth.

CONCLUSION
At its core, the introduction of technical, scientific, or other expert evidence
into legal cases raises several overarching concerns, including the difficulty of
distinguishing experts from convincing frauds; confusion caused by
disagreements between experts; a lack of judicial training in the underlying
methods and those methods’ vulnerabilities; and an exacerbation of equality of
resources issues.117 While many of the digital methodologies that feed into civil
and criminal investigations can be promising additions to investigative toolkits,
enthusiasm for these techniques should be tempered with healthy skepticism—
and knowledge of the most helpful questions to ask about any digital open source
investigative process.
This task is not easy, nor straightforward. The complexity of the online
information environment—riddled with botnets, sock puppets, trolls, deepfakes
and shallowfakes, and operating at an almost unfathomable speed and scale—is
simultaneously overwhelming and yet invaluable for identifying information
that can contribute to justice and accountability. Our goal with this article has
been to break down the very real vulnerabilities in digital open source
investigations and encourage careful analysis of each component in order to
make the risks more manageable.
Given the issues detailed above, we recommend that digital investigators
preserve content according to emerging forensic standards and carefully
document their investigative process. Witnesses should refrain from giving
opinions on matters to which they do not have the proper expertise, while
lawyers and judges need to be equipped to adequately ascertain the reliability
and validity of digital open source information and the quality of its analysis. In

116. For more on virtual reality advances and pioneering uses of virtual reality in legal processes, see, e.g.,
Methodology → Virtual Reality, FORENSIC ARCHITECTURE, https://forensic-architecture.org/methodology/
virtualreality (last visited July 1, 2022). Groups like Forensic Architecture are increasingly using virtual reality
to aid witnesses’ recollections of events and to help judges understand the layout of sites that are relevant to
cases.
117. In addition to the resource differentials, junk science has often been found to benefit prosecutors or
plaintiffs more than the defense. See generally Aviva A. Orenstein, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended:
Why Prosecutors Resist Challenges to Bad Science and Some Suggestions for Crafting Remedies for Wrongful
Conviction Based on Changed Science, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1139 (2018).
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the meantime, digital open source information should be triangulated with
physical, testimonial, or other documentary evidence whenever possible. If
conducted carefully and professionally, digital open source investigations can
offer tremendous value for both civil and criminal proceedings, internationally
and at home.118

118. See generally BERKELEY PROTOCOL, supra note 11, at 12–13.

